Atilla Yesilada video: Turkish Politics 2025: War at home, peace abroad
turkey politics
Your favorite influencer is back in business after a month long absence caused by minor health ailments. In our previous video, we made predictions regarding Turkish economy. This lenghty video is dedicated to politics. I wanted to explain my views in writing, too, because Turkish politics is extremely convoluted this year. Here is a write up I used in a conference
[embed]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dv0mKx2HT5E[/embed]
Erdogan's quest for a third term drives Turkish politics
- Erdogan is a lame-duck but he wants to be reelected, a desire fully shared by his nationalist ally Bahceli, which is the driving force of Turkish politics.
- There are two escape clauses for Erdogan regaining eligibility. A new constitution, or early elections called by the Grand Assembly.
- Since AKP-MHP need at least 35 votes from the opposition, both paths are perilous.
- Since the main opposition party CHP has set a firm deadline of November 2025 for early elections, Erdogan is trying the constitutional path.
- This is the fork where the story becomes extremely convoluted. To make a long story short, constitutional talks are a dead end.
- I’m optimistic about Syrian Kurdish entity being absorbed into the central government, but stabilizing and uniting Syria will take at least a year, which could witness severe inter-sectarian and ethnic clashes.
- Erdogan-Trump relationship is an upside for Turkish diplomacy and markets, but its fundamental value is eliminating some bad case scenarios.
- At the end, my base case scenario with 60% probability is early elections by 1Q2026.
- The alternative scenario envisions Erdogan “leaving things to chance”, which may end up in his retirement.
- For constitutional talks to get underway, PKK affiliate PYD-YPG in Syria must be eliminated. This merges domestic politics with the Syria file.
- Ankara and Damascus are in full agreement that Syrian Kurds must be denied an autonomous region, and their military wing to be absorbed into the national army.
- Turkey can break the Kurdish resistance by a new military campaign, but this would tremendously complicate recovery in Syria, and may anger the Trump administration.
- However I’m optimistic that Trump will withdraw American troops from Syria, entrusting defending against ISIS to Turkey and al Sharaa regime.
- In this case, Erdogan will herald the end of the terrorist threat, inviting pro-Kurdish DEM Party to join in on constitutional talks.
- Trump and Israel deciding to side with Syrian Kurds would stop a Turkish invasion, but will also cast a deep shadow on the Erdogan-Trump relationship which is based on mutual trust.
- Yet, I argue that Trump will focus on stabilizing Syria, and sacrifice America’s stalwart ally Syrian Kurds—with some guarantees for their security and local autonomy.
- Turkey’s second priority in help al Sharaa stabilize Syria, which is a very difficult task. It entails dealing with numerous quarreling rival factions as well guiding al Sharaa’s Islamist regime in its relations with the West to secure enough funding for reconstruction.
- Turkey will get her way with Kurds, but a brief civil war in Syria can’t be dismissed.
- At the end though, al Sharaa regime will win because there are no enteral powers to bankroll its rivals.
- Once Syrian is firmly under the control of central government, reconstruction will start, which will cost anywhere from $250-450bn.
- Turkey stands to benefit from lucrative tenders, increasing trade, as well as Syrian refugees going home.
- Erdogan-Trump relationship offers some upsides, but its value is mostly in terms of averting bad-case scenarios.
- For an amicable relationship to bloom into better bilateral relations, there are two preconditions. First, US troops must withdraw from Syria. Secondly, some kind of truce in the Gaza-cum-Lebanon wars must prevail, in the absence of which Erdogan’s constituency will force him to stand against Israel, at the annoyance of the White House.
- The long-term advantage of a trust relationship between Erdogan and Trump is providing a hedge against multiple and very expensive lawsuits, like that of Halkbank for violations of Iran sanctions.
- The main upside is Turkey joining the F-35 jet fighter program in return for turning over the command of Russian made S-400 missiles to NATO officers.
- Trump could also soothe Erdogan’s concerns about American military build-up in Cyprus and Greece, which could possibly open the way for honest negotiations on the future of the divided island, as well as the status of the Aegean Sea.
- The risk: Trump trying to draft Turkey to pressure Russia to make peace with Ukraine and to weaken Iran.
