Atilla Yesilada video: Turkish Politics 2025: War at home, peace abroad

Your favorite  influencer is back in business after a month long absence caused by minor health ailments.  In our previous video, we made predictions regarding Turkish economy.  This lenghty video is dedicated to politics. I wanted to explain my views in writing, too, because Turkish politics is extremely convoluted this year. Here is a write up I used in a conference

 

Erdogan’s quest for a third term drives Turkish politics

  • Erdogan is a lame-duck but he wants to be reelected, a desire fully shared by his nationalist ally Bahceli, which is the driving force of Turkish politics.
  • There are two escape clauses for Erdogan regaining eligibility. A new constitution, or early elections called by the Grand Assembly.
  • Since AKP-MHP need at least 35 votes from the opposition, both paths are perilous.
  • Since the main opposition party CHP has set a firm deadline of November 2025 for early elections, Erdogan is trying the constitutional path.
  • This is the fork where the story becomes extremely convoluted. To make a long story short, constitutional talks are a dead end.
  • I’m optimistic about Syrian Kurdish  entity being absorbed into the central government, but stabilizing and uniting Syria will take at least a year, which could witness severe inter-sectarian and ethnic clashes.
  • Erdogan-Trump relationship is an upside for Turkish diplomacy and markets, but its fundamental value is eliminating some bad case scenarios.

Domestic politics:  Still betting on early elections

  • At the end, my base case scenario with 60% probability is early elections by 1Q2026.
  • The alternative scenario envisions Erdogan “leaving things to chance”, which may end up in his retirement.
  • For constitutional talks to get underway, PKK affiliate PYD-YPG in Syria must be eliminated. This merges domestic politics with the Syria file.
  • Ankara and Damascus are in full agreement that Syrian Kurds must be denied an autonomous region, and their military wing to be absorbed into the national army.
  • Turkey can break the Kurdish resistance by a new military campaign, but this would tremendously complicate recovery in Syria, and may anger the Trump administration.

The Syria file:  Good news, bad news

  • However I’m optimistic that Trump will withdraw American troops from Syria, entrusting defending against ISIS to Turkey and al Sharaa regime.
  • In this case, Erdogan will herald the end of the terrorist threat, inviting pro-Kurdish DEM Party to join in on constitutional talks.
  • Trump and Israel deciding to side with Syrian Kurds would stop a Turkish invasion, but will also cast a deep shadow on the Erdogan-Trump relationship which is based on mutual trust.
  • Yet, I argue that Trump will focus on stabilizing Syria, and sacrifice America’s stalwart ally Syrian Kurds—with some guarantees for their security and local autonomy.

Peace in Syria is still beyond the horizon

  • Turkey’s second priority in help al Sharaa stabilize Syria, which is a very difficult task.  It entails dealing with  numerous quarreling rival factions as well guiding al Sharaa’s Islamist regime in its relations with the West to secure enough funding for reconstruction.
  • Turkey will get her way with Kurds, but a brief civil war in Syria can’t be dismissed.
  • At the end though, al Sharaa regime will win because there are no enteral powers to bankroll its rivals.
  • Once Syrian is firmly under the control of central government, reconstruction will start, which will cost anywhere from $250-450bn.
  • Turkey stands to benefit from lucrative tenders, increasing trade, as well as Syrian refugees going home.

Trump and Erdogan:  Bromance or frenemies?

 

  • Erdogan-Trump relationship offers some upsides, but its value is mostly in terms of averting bad-case scenarios.
  • For an amicable relationship to bloom into better bilateral relations, there are two preconditions. First, US troops must withdraw from Syria. Secondly, some kind of truce in the Gaza-cum-Lebanon wars must prevail, in the absence of which Erdogan’s constituency will force him to stand against Israel, at the annoyance of the White House.
  • The long-term advantage of a trust relationship between Erdogan and Trump is providing a hedge against multiple and very expensive lawsuits, like that of Halkbank for violations of Iran sanctions.
  • The main upside is Turkey joining the F-35 jet fighter program in return for turning over the command of Russian made S-400 missiles to NATO officers.
  • Trump could also soothe Erdogan’s concerns about American military build-up in Cyprus and Greece, which could possibly open the way for honest negotiations on the future of the divided island, as well as the status of the Aegean Sea.
  • The risk: Trump trying to draft  Turkey to pressure Russia to make peace with Ukraine and to weaken Iran.

 

Published By: Atilla Yeşilada

GlobalSource Partners’ Turkey Country Analyst Atilla Yesilada is the country’s leading political analyst and commentator. He is known throughout the finance and political science world for his thorough and outspoken coverage of Turkey’s political and financial developments. In addition to his extensive writing schedule, he is often called upon to provide his political expertise on major radio and television channels. Based in Istanbul, Atilla is co-founder of the information platform Istanbul Analytics and is one of GlobalSource’s local partners in Turkey. In addition to his consulting work and speaking engagements throughout the US, Europe and the Middle East, he writes regular columns for Turkey’s leading financial websites VATAN and www.paraanaliz.com and has contributed to the financial daily Referans and the liberal daily Radikal.