PANORAMATR’s surveys conducted between April and July show that voters have largely maintained their voting preference in the March 31 elections. This four-month trend means that we have entered a new era in terms of voter preferences, voter-politics and the relationship between the government and the opposition. The most important reflection of this new era is the fact that politics will be shaped not only by Erdoğan and the party and/or alliance he leads, but also by Erdoğan (and his alliance) and the CHP, and the interaction between these two actors, as it has been the case in the last 22 years.
Nearly four months have passed since the local elections. In this time, both voter tendencies and the possible political routes and capacities of political parties and actors have become clear to a great extent.
In terms of voter tendencies, the most curious question was to what extent voters would translate their preferences in local elections into a possible general election preference. As it will be remembered, the May 14, 2023 elections were not permanent in terms of voter tendencies. Opinion polls conducted immediately after the elections, as well as the local elections held 10 months after the elections, showed that the trends in the May elections were not permanent.
Now, however, a different situation is emerging. PANORAMATR’s surveys conducted in April, May, June and July show that voters have largely maintained their voting preferences in the March 31st elections. This four-month trend reveals that the local election results have created a new axis regarding voter preferences and political parties’ vote share.This means that we have entered a new era in terms of voter preferences, voter-politics and the relationship between the government and the opposition.
In this respect, it would not be wrong to say that the March 31st elections had a more critical impact on the structural dynamics and possible course of Turkish political life than the May 14th elections.
This is also reflected in the behavior of political actors and parties. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, politics witnessed an intense movement through three main dynamics. The possibility that the dialog between President Erdoğan and Özgür Özel could transform the political ground, the crisis within the People’s Alliance – in the eyes of Bahçeli and MHP – over the developments in the Sinan Ateş case, and the new constitutional process, which is attributed different political meanings over the possible fate of these two.
Towards the end of June, political expectations and scenarios fed by these three dynamics quickly fizzled out. While Özel sabotaged the normalization process by failing to resist internal party pressures, Erdoğan also failed to resist intra-alliance pressures and reassured the axis of the People’s Alliance. The constitutional agenda has also lost momentum – for now.
In fact, while the continuation of the normalization process offers serious political advantages to the CHP, the continuation of the People’s Alliance poses serious handicaps as well as opportunities for Erdoğan. Despite this, both leaders preferred to cling to their comfort zones instead of reaching for possible gains.The political calendar may have played a role in Erdoğan and Özel’s willingness to maintain the status quo rather than manage the resistance they faced. If held on normal time, the elections are still four years away. Actors are aware that they cannot achieve their electoral goals by maintaining their current political coordinates, but they need to spend at least the next 1-1.5 years in the comfort of the status quo.
President Erdoğan expects the economic indicators to improve during this period, and until they do, he will rely on the political and administrative comfort provided by the People’s Alliance to fend off possible political interventions. The CHP, on the other hand, needs time for internal party power dynamics to fall into place and to consolidate its potential support through the municipalities won and a new discourse and politics. In addition to these two parties, which have the capacity to set the political agenda, other political parties also need a certain period of time to restructure.
Therefore, it would not be wrong to predict that politics and political actors will prefer to proceed on a predictable axis based on today’s coordinates as much as possible until 2026, and that after 2026 they will turn towards more structural and radical changes.In this framework, it is possible to explain the new political axis that emerged after the March 31st elections and will continue until 2026 -unless something unexpected happens- through five dynamics.
Change in the First Party
The first dynamic of the new era is that the AK Party has – by far – lost its position as the first party and is now in a neck-to-neck competition with the CHP.
Since 2002, the party system and political life in Turkey has been shaped by the AK Party. Since the 2002 elections, the AK Party has not only been the first party, but also had a vote share well above that of the party following it (CHP), and often even above the sum of the next two parties (CHP and MHP/HDP). This was the political picture even in the 2018 and 2023 elections, when the AK Party lost significant votes.The March 31st elections radically changed this situation. For the first time in its political life, the AK Party lost its position (and privilege) as the first party. Opinion polls show that voters have largely maintained their preferences in the local elections and that the CHP has higher support than the AK Party in a possible general election.
The voting gap between the CHP and the AK Party is quite low, so it would not be a surprise if this gap closes and/or the AK Party becomes the first party again in the coming period. There is a more intense political struggle in the opposition than in the ruling party. Possible revivals in the DEM Party, IYI Party, Zafer Party and TİP, as well as possible tensions within the CHP could negatively affect the CHP’s vote share.
The alternatives that the ruling electorate may turn to are more limited. A large portion of the voters who have distanced themselves from the AK Party are waiting in the swing voter bloc. The possible addresses that these voters may turn to are – for now – limited to MHP and YRP. Both seem far from becoming a permanent alternative for voters who are disenchanted with the AK Party. Therefore, AK Party voters are still primarily looking at Erdoğan and the AK Party. Moreover, given the strong impact of the economy on the AK Party’s loss of votes, it is possible that possible positive developments in the economy in the coming period will also reflect positively on the ruling party. Therefore, when compared in terms of the political struggle and alternative addresses on the ruling and opposition fronts, it can be said that Erdoğan and/or the AK Party have an advantage over the CHP. In this framework, considering the low gap between the CHP and the AK Party, it would be better not to deny the possibility of the AK Party becoming the first party again in the coming period.
However, this will not change the fact that we have entered a new era in Turkey’s political party system and political life after March 31st. Of course, the CHP’s becoming the first party has a symbolic meaning, but even if the AK Party becomes the first party again, the difference between it and the CHP will remain minimal. This means that unless one of them shows an unexpected political performance – positive or negative – that radically changes its current position, we have entered a period in which the first place will be shared or change hands frequently.
Therefore, politics will no longer be shaped solely by Erdoğan (and the alliance he leads), but by the struggle and interaction between Erdoğan and the CHP.
Breaking the Monopoly of Political Hegemony
The second dynamic of the new era, which can also be seen as a natural consequence of the first feature, is that the political hegemony of Erdoğan, the People’s Alliance and the AK Party has weakened to a great extent.
The over 50 percent social support that President Erdoğan enjoyed through the AK Party until 2018 and the People’s Alliance since 2018 enabled him to establish a strong political hegemony, define the grounds of political legitimacy, set the agenda and confine the opposition to a certain sphere of action.
The March 31 elections seem to have changed this situation. As the possibility and capacity of Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance to establish political hegemony weakens, the CHP does not feel the need to stay within the political boundaries set by the government as before, and seems determined to move towards a discourse and politics according to its own priorities.
The weakening of the monopoly of political legitimacy that has belonged to the People’s Alliance for a long time and the CHP’s willingness to go beyond the political coordinates determined by the government through diversified effective political actors will directly affect the political agenda and priorities, problem topics and solution formulas.
In this framework, the debates in recent months over the trustee policy, the Sinan Ateş file, the salary increase for pensioners, the dialogue with the Assad regime and the normalization/softening process, and the context and content of these debates should be linked to the structural transformation that took place after the elections in the context of political hegemony and the monopoly of legitimacy.
Change in Political Orientation
The third dynamic of the new era – related to both of the above-mentioned features – is related to the transformation in the political orientation of Erdoğan and the CHP. The main dynamic that brought Erdoğan and the AK Party to the strongest and longest-lasting power of the multi-party era was to be the political spokesperson and carrier of those who demanded justice, equality and freedom in the political, economic or cultural spheres against the tutelage and the established order.
The change in political priorities since 2013 was not considered a problem to the extent that it was deemed necessary in the eyes of the society through the priority of fending off real threats, and it was accepted, if not internalized. However, the politics of survival, the People’s Alliance and the Presidential System, which were oriented to eliminate internal and external security threats, created their own political priorities and habits, and continued to exist after the threats were fended off, leading to the questioning of the political mission that society attributed to Erdoğan and the AK Party.
The perception that the leader and the party, which were supported by the society to protect the rights and laws of society against the state, of politics against the bureaucracy, and to be the pioneer of change against the status quo, had changed course in the state-society, bureaucracy-politics and status quo-change equation, resulted in a decline in social support. Of course, it is possible to add to this the many injustices and weaknesses in the performance of power and governance, especially the economic crisis, as a natural consequence of the change of course.
This situation has directly affected the political will and orientation of Erdoğan and the AK Party. During his 22 years in power, Erdoğan overcame many crises by leaning on society, turning to politics and changing the status quo. Today, to the extent that he does not turn to these, he is having difficulty overcoming the crisis he is in. It is even trying to preserve the status quo it created by leaning on the state, sometimes despite/against society and the masses. This also affects the public’s perception and expectations towards Erdoğan and the AK Party.
The CHP, on the other hand, is trying to move away from the state, the bureaucracy and the status quo with which it is identified by large segments of society. While the AK Party focuses on preserving the status quo it has established, the CHP expresses its desire to move away from the politics of position. While the AK Party is turning inward and retreating to defense, the CHP is trying to open up and establish a dialogue with social segments it has not previously addressed. While the AK Party identifies with the state and responds to problems and demands mostly from a state perspective, the CHP tends to become a spokesperson for social problems.
As a matter of fact, the concept sets used by the parties in the March 31st elections were recorded as a reflection of this change in position. Of course, this change in discourse, politics and orientation between the AK Party and CHP is not yet a finalized process for both actors. As of today, it is mostly limited to the level of orientation and perception and needs to be tested on many critical issues and topics in the coming period. However, even if it is limited to perception and orientation for now, it is possible to see this situation as a situation that will directly affect the political fate of Erdoğan and the AK Party and the CHP.
Alliance Politics and Its Reflections
The fourth dynamic is related to alliance politics and the level of influence of parties on alliance politics. Since 2017, politics has been shaped through alliances as the presidential system indexes power to a 50+1 percent vote share. While alliance politics allowed political parties to “stay in the game”, it damaged their capacity to produce politics, their will to “set up their own game” and the representational relationship between voters and politics.
While the Millet Alliance (and other alliances in the opposition bloc) disintegrated after the May 2023 elections, opposition voters consolidated around the CHP to balance the ruling bloc in the March 31st elections. Thus, the CHP was able to benefit from the advantages of the alliance without bearing its disadvantages.
This gives the CHP a great advantage over the AK Party, which has to maintain the People’s Alliance. While the CHP is freed from the burden of the institutional alliance and has the opportunity to address the entire social opposition with a grassroots alliance approach, the AK Party has to consider the institutional priorities of the MHP at every step instead of the expectations of the alliance base. To the extent that the CHP sheds the burden of the alliance, it gains a wider field of action and the initiative to produce politics, while the AK Party is stuck in a narrow field of action and cannot take political initiative to the extent that it has to consider the MHP at every step. While the CHP is on a growth trend because it is free from the alliance, Erdoğan and the AK Party continue to struggle with the risk of shrinking as long as they are tied to the alliance.
As a matter of fact, the mobilization around the Ateş file and the normalization/softening process that marked the month of June revealed the cost of the alliance for Erdoğan and the AK Party. The AK Party and CHP’s relationship with the politics of alliance will directly affect many political developments in the coming period.
Change in the Ranking of the Parties
The last dynamic for the new period concerns the vote share of the political parties and their position on the scale. After the March 31st elections, all three surveys we conducted show that while CHP and AK Party are close to each other in the first tier, DEM, MHP and YRP are well below the first tier, at the margin of the electoral threshold, in a close band to each other. In this new ranking, which includes two parties in the 25 percent band and three parties in the 5-7 percent band in direct preferences, the other parties are in the 2-3 band, well below the threshold anchor.
This new positioning will have several political repercussions. First of all, in the new period, the AK Party and CHP will assume the mission of dragging politics and leading politics.
The AK Party and CHP will be the pioneers and carriers of the ruling-opposition axis.However, neither of them has enough votes to lead on its own. Both need the support of another party or parties. This makes the DEM Party, MHP and YRP key parties, despite being on the margin of the threshold.It can be predicted that the MHP and the DEM Party will be at opposite poles for political/historical reasons.
While the AKP will receive the support of the MHP through the alliance, the CHP will have to take the DEM Party into account in its policies and discourse. The situation of the YRP is a bit more complicated. While the YRP is in the ruling basin in terms of its grassroots composition, it has opposition characteristics in terms of its political stance and discourse. Its fate will depend on how it resolves this contradiction.
Politics and Society in Limbo
In addition to these five dynamics, other dynamics such as the crisis in nationalist representation, the DEM Party’s positioning pains and the search for an alternative to the AK Party in the right-conservative basin are likely to have an impact on the politics after March 31st. However, in the short and medium term, the likelihood of these searches determining political debates will be weaker than the five dynamics mentioned above.
In this framework, it is possible to predict – for the time being – that politics after March 31st will be shaped largely by the political conditions determined by these five dynamics.
These five dynamics show that after March 31st, the political ground and the opportunities and positions of political actors have structurally changed and that we are in the transition phase to a new era.
The most important reflection of the new era is the fact that politics will no longer be shaped solely by Erdoğan and the party and/or alliance he leads, as it has been the case in the last 22 years, but by Erdoğan (and his alliance) and the CHP, and by the mutual interaction of these two actors.
This will directly affect both the political course and performance of Erdoğan/AK Party and CHP and the public’s view of Erdoğan/AK Party and CHP.
On March 31st, the electorate taught Erdoğan a serious lesson and gave the CHP a strong credit, putting politics on a new balance. In the past three months, the CHP has been making an effort to make the best use of the loan, while President Erdoğan has not yet made a serious effort to fulfill the lesson that society has taught him through the local elections.
The public sees that the CHP is making a serious effort, but in order to make a final decision, it wants to see whether the CHP can truly change and then develop a political vision that can change Turkey.
Similarly, it wants to observe Erdoğan’s dilemmas and see whether he can lead a genuine change in political and administrative coordinates.
In short, the society has not yet given up on Erdoğan, nor is it completely convinced of the CHP. It sees that both Erdoğan and the CHP have differentiated and transformed, but it thinks that this transformation has not yet reached its final course. Therefore, it will continue to watch both actors carefully in the coming period.
The upcoming period will be shaped by the capacity of both actors to read the post-March 31st period correctly and to fulfill the necessary requirements with the right discourse and policies.