Arab World is understandably extremely concerned bout the escalating war in Libya, which is drawing in actors from outside Africa. In particular Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli and recognize by UN causes outrage because most current Arab nations were Ottoman colonies at one time or the other in their history. Egypt’s President Sisi threatened war in Libya, if pro-Turkey forces advance to Sirte and al Jufra airbase. On Saturday, Russian press reported the mercenary group the Wagner group taking over an oilfield to stop production. While the issue has not attracted much attention in the World press and investment circles, it is vital to answer the question of whether Sisi would dare face the pro-Turkish forces, and vise versa. Two expert opinions suggest all out war is very unlikely.
Is Cairo Going to War?
Carnegie senior fellow Yezid Sayigh has written extensively on the Egyptian military, particularly in the context of the Program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States, which he leads. In a recent Carnegie report, he provided a detailed anatomy of Egypt’s military economy. In light of this, Sayigh was asked by a journalist to comment on the warning by Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi on June 20 that Egyptian forces would intervene in Libya if Turkish-backed forces of the Government of National Accord crossed the Sirte-Jufra frontline. His answers are reproduced below.
Question: How likely is Egypt to intervene militarily in Libya or enter into direct confrontation with Turkish forces there?
Yezid Sayigh: The possibility that Egypt will intervene directly is increasing, although I think the Sisi administration strongly prefers not to, and will only do so as a last resort. If it does intervene, this does not have to be a full intervention in order to be effective in dissuading forces loyal to the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and its Turkish backers from advancing to or past the Sirte-Jufra line. Nor does the Egyptian military need to advance to that line itself or confront Turkish-backed forces directly.
Question: Could declared United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabian backing for an Egyptian military intervention help win the war against Turkish-backed forces in Libya?
YS: There will not be a total war involving Egyptian forces in Libya. The UAE could resume and expand both arms supplies and the combat role of their air force in support of the Libyan National Army, in coordination with the Egyptian military. But I don’t expect the UAE to tip the balance any more than they already have in the past. I suspect that Saudi support will mostly be declaratory.
Most important, however, is that Egypt will not engage in a major war in Libya just to fulfill the strategic agenda of the UAE or Saudi Arabia. We saw that with the Sisi administration’s refusal to join the joint Emirati-Saudi war effort in Yemen, despite the strength of their political relationship and the massive financial and economic investment the two Gulf monarchies had made in Egypt. The outcome of Egyptian intervention will be strategic stalemate, which hopefully could lead to a more serious diplomatic effort by the international community to produce a lasting political settlement of the Libyan conflict.
Middle East Eye: Conflict, partnership, stalemate: Egypt and Turkey’s Libya options
The bruising defeat of Khalifa Haftar’s assault on Tripoli at the hands of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), has forced Egypt to rethink its strategy and support for the man it hoped could be Libya’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
In a speech before an audience that included Libyan tribal leaders on Saturday, Sisi said Egypt did not want to intervene in Libya and generally favoured a political solution, but added that “the situation now is different”.
“If the Libyan people moved through you and asked us to intervene, this would be a signal to the world that Egypt and Libya are one country, one interest,” he added.
Though confrontational, Sisi’s words have been taken by many observers with a pinch of salt – an approach encouraged by the president’s own foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, who said any interpretation that the speech was a declaration of war was wide of the mark.
Certainly, it appears Turkey does not expect its drones, allied Syrian mercenaries or hardware in Libya to be confronting the US-funded Egyptian military any time soon.
“Egypt’s threats do not seem to be very serious, considering that Cairo is already doing its best to support Haftar in Libya,” a Turkish official told Middle East Eye, speaking on condition of anonymity due to government protocol.
“It seems like an attempt to pressure the GNA to accept a ceasefire, possibly backed by Russians,” the official added. “We don’t know if Egypt has the necessary capacity to further increase its involvement in Libya.”
Likewise, Murat Yesiltas, a senior expert at Ankara-based think tank Seta, cast doubt on the seriousness of Sisi’s threats.
“I don’t find his statements very realistic,” he said. “I believe Sisi has intended to use this statement as a deterrent but not as a serious threat to use military force.”
Yesiltas explained that the long distance between Egypt and Sirte – around 800km – would make it difficult for the Egyptian armed forces to intervene.
Additionally, he said, Egypt is currently facing two major security threats: Islamic State group-linked militants in the Sinai Peninsula and Ethiopia’s plans to fill the Grand Renaissance Dam, which poses an immediate threat to Egypt’s share of Nile water.
Mediterranean gas politics
With open conflict seemingly off the table, there have been some suggestions that mutual interests in the Mediterranean could even pull Ankara and Cairo together.
Turkey and the GNA in November signed a maritime delimitation agreement marking out a swathe of the eastern Mediterranean as part of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
According to Khaled Fouad, a Middle East energy and political analyst, the pact offers Egypt two avenues of interest.
First, it would prevent the establishment of the EastMed gas pipeline, which would have threatened Egypt’s economic and geopolitical interest by bringing Israeli gas to Europe via Cyprus and Greece.
With gas liquification terminals in Idku and Damietta, Egypt has the infrastructure to become a hub for gas exports to Europe, a position that would be undermined if the EastMed pipeline is established.
Observers have already cast doubt on whether the EastMed pipeline is viable because it is both costly and there is uncertainty around the price of its gas exports, with Russia and Qatar already supplying Europe with cheap gas.
The Turkey-GNA deal adds to that complication because the new EEZ created overlaps with the EastMed route, which has now been earmarked as Turkish-Libyan waters.
Secondly, a rival maritime border agreement proposed by Greece and currently being negotiated with Cairo would favour Athens more than Cairo, according to Fouad.
It would give Greece more EEZ than Egypt, while the Turkish delineation, on the other hand, gives Cairo comparatively more waters.
Tempting as Turkey’s EEZ offer may be, Egypt’s allies may make a sudden change of heart an impossibility.
According to Fouad, the Egyptian government’s political priorities are determined not by its national interest but by regional alliances with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, formed in the wake of the 2013 coup that put Sisi in power.
The result, Fouad added, is that Sisi would never be able to come to an arrangement with Turkey – Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s great rival – “because he is bound by other regional alliances that are helping him to stay in power”.
Increasing aggressiveness
Claudia Gazzini, the International Crisis Group’s consulting analyst for Libya, concurs that negotiations could benefit both parties far more than further conflict.
“If Turkey were to persuade Cairo to engage in a negotiation track, Egypt will actually get more in terms of square kilometers of the Mediterranean,” she told MEE.
But Ankara’s increasing aggressiveness in Libya is threatening for Egypt, she added, despite the mutual benefits that could come out of Turkey cementing its position in Libya.
Watch our video on Turkey and Libya: ANALYSIS: Libya: War In a War Within War